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ABSTRACT
The current study investigated the effects of state and trait empathy in legal judgments and tested the 
relationship between trait and state emotion in one hundred and fifty eight students aged 18-59. 
Assessments were taken of participants’ trait empathy and then state empathy was induced in half the 
sample. Following this all participants read a trial transcript and made judgments regarding: the verdict 
decision; the defendant’s responsibility for the offense; what would be an appropriate punishment; the 
likelihood that the offender would offend in the future; and whether the defendant felt remorse for 
committing the offense. Findings showed that both trait and state empathy predicted attributions of 
offender remorse. State empathy also predicted judgments of offender responsibility and agreement with 
verdict decisions in a lenient direction. Findings also showed that state and trait empathy did not interact. 
The results indicate that trait and state empathy work independently to influence legal judgments and that 
inducing empathy in decision-makers can impact on trial outcomes above and beyond the facts of the case.
© 2014 Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos de Madrid. All rights reserved. 
‘Sé cómo se deben sentir’: Empatía y juicio de los acusados
RESUMEN
Se analizaron los efectos de la empatía estado y rasgo en los juicios legales, y se examinó la relación entre la 
emoción estado y rasgo. Participaron en el estudio ciento cincuenta y ocho estudiantes de entre 18 y 59 
años. Se evaluó la empatía-rasgo de los participantes, y posteriormente se indujo la empatía como estado a 
la mitad de la muestra. Todos los participantes leyeron la transcripción de un juicio sobre el que se les pidió 
que dictaminaran: el veredicto; la responsabilidad del acusado en el delito; cuál sería un castigo apropiado; 
la probabilidad de que el acusado reincidiera en el futuro; y si el acusado había sentido remordimientos por 
el delito cometido. Los resultados mostraron que, tanto la empatía estado como la empatía rasgo, predecían 
atribuciones de remordimiento en el acusado. La empatía como estado también predecía juicios más indul-
gentes sobre la responsabilidad del acusado y el acuerdo con el veredicto. Además, los resultados también 
pusieron de manifiesto que la empatía estado y la empatía rasgo no interactuaban. Los resultados indicaron 
que la empatía estado y rasgo actúan de manera independiente influenciando los juicios legales, y que la 
inducción de empatía en las personas que toman decisiones puede influir en los resultados del juicio más 
allá de los hechos.
© 2014 Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos de Madrid. Todos los derechos reservados.
In the UK, a crown court Judge suspended an offender’s six-month 
prison sentence when the defendant cried in the dock. This was, the 
Judge stated, because the offender’s tears demonstrated his remorse 
for committing the offense. However, the offender later admitted 
that he felt no remorse and had cried because he feared imprisonment 
(BBC News, 2006). If even experienced professionals erroneously 
attribute emotions to others and use these to make important 
judgments, it seems unlikely that lay legal decision-makers, such as 
jurors, can be expected to make more “accurate” decisions. This 
study examined the role of empathy and attributions of remorse to 
an offender in case-related judgments.
Affect control theory (ACT; Heise, 1979) explains how people 
make misguided attributions of emotions, such as remorse, to others. 
ACT asserts that people strive to maintain self-associated meaning. 
That is, people tend to behave consistently across situations unless 
situations create temporary deviations from personal meanings and 
create uncharacteristic responses. For example, someone who is 
generally considerate of others may, due to situational influences, 
behave uncharacteristically and fail to consider others’ feelings. 
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Observers of this uncharacteristic behavior might expect that the 
target would subsequently experience and show remorse for their 
actions. ACT maintains that observers will use such negative 
emotional displays to inform judgments about the type of person 
they are.
Since members of a jury cannot legally actually know a defendant, 
they may use a defendant’s emotional demeanor as a guide to their 
subsequent judgments of the type of person she/he is and his/her 
role in the offense. For instance, negative emotional displays may 
generate more positive judgments of a defendant (i.e. she/he is a 
fundamentally good person; that the crime resulted from situational 
not intrapersonal factors; that the defendant feels remorse for their 
part in the offense). Research using ACT supports this by showing 
that when a defendant appears to be sad, observers evaluate his/her 
identity more positively. The result of this positive evaluation is that 
observers may recommend shorter sentences and are less inclined to 
believe that the defendant will commit a similar offense in the future 
(MacLin, Downs, MacLin, & Caspers, 2009). However, what is not 
clear from previous work is whether these more lenient judgments 
result solely from the defendant’s emotional display or whether 
other factors such as an observer’s empathy also influences 
judgments.
Empathy has many definitions but for the purposes of this study 
Davis’ definition was used. This definition claims that empathy is a 
multidimensional construct involving taking the perspective of 
another resulting in a cognitive adoption and emotional 
understanding of his/her perspective (Davis, 1983). The observer also 
experiences an emotional reaction to the target’s emotional display 
and uses this as a basis for decisions regarding the target (Davis, 
1983). So, in the case of the judge outlined above, the defendant’s 
emotional display may have generated an emotional response in the 
judge who used this to inform his decision regarding the defendant’s 
sentence.
Empathy and Legal Decisions
Empathy has two forms: Trait empathy is a stable personality 
characteristic whilst state empathy is temporary and can be induced. 
The value of inducing state empathy in jurors is recognized by 
lawyers who urge that empathy may be manipulated via attorneys’ 
statements and during cross-examination of witnesses (Stevenson, 
Najdowski, Bottoms, & Haegerich, 2009). However, it remains unclear 
whether it is trait, state or a combination of both forms of empathy 
that influences judgments in a court case.
So far, little work has been conducted to examine the role of trait 
empathy in judgments of defendants. Research findings suggest that 
when judging others, high trait empathizers hold defendants less 
responsible for an offense and favour lenient punishments (Colby, 
2012; Chin, 2012) High trait empathizers also interpret offenders’ 
displays of remorse as arising from concern for the victim, recognition 
of personal responsibility for events and acceptance that punishment 
will follow (Brooks & Reddon, 2003). In contrast, low trait empathizers 
interpret an offender’s remorse as an indication of the offender’s 
knowledge that she/he has violated other people’s values and 
standards. Low trait empathizers also see an offender’s remorse as 
emanating from a fear of punishment rather than from concern for 
the victim (Brooks & Reddon, 2003). 
Far more research has examined state empathy. This may be 
justified since, as noted above, state empathy can be induced in 
jurors via courtroom processes, whilst identifying trait empathy in 
potential jurors is more problematic (Plumm & Terrance, 2009). 
Inducing state empathy, typically via attorneys’ opening statements, 
is easily done and may have an enduring influence on jurors’ 
preferences for the defense or the prosecution from the start of a 
trial (Pyszczynski & Wrightsman, 1981). Mock juror studies show 
how state empathy for a defendant results in the crime being 
attributed to situational rather than dispositional factors (Archer, 
Foushee, Davis, & Aderman, 1979). Mock jurors who make situational 
rather than dispositional judgments also attribute less responsibility 
to the defendant, and make fewer judgments of guilt (Haegerich & 
Bottoms, 2000).
Trait and State Empathy Interaction
Since the examination of trait empathy in judicial judgments is so 
limited, its role, if any, in initiating state empathy is not clear. So, 
since it cannot be verified that state empathy stands alone, it may be 
that trait and state empathy work in concert to influence judgments. 
The relationship between state and trait empathy is likely to act in 
accordance with one of Rusting’s (1998, 1999) three theoretical 
frameworks of trait and mood congruency in judgments, where: 1) 
state empathy (temporary emotion) and trait empathy (stable 
disposition) have independent effects (i.e. neither influences the 
other); 2) trait empathy moderates state empathy (i.e. judgments are 
either state empathy congruent or incongruent due to trait empathy’s 
influence); and 3) the effect of trait empathy on processing emotional 
cues are mediated by state empathy (i.e. state empathy enables trait 
empathy to be expressed).
Research examining emotions has shown that emotional traits 
generally correlate positively with emotional states, and generate a 
propensity to experience related emotional states (Rusting, 1999). 
Consequently, the robust effects of state empathy observed in 
research may actually stem from the underlying influence of trait 
empathy and in trials that last for weeks or even months the enduring 
influence of traits on decisions may be even more important. 
However, research also shows that people may behave ‘out of 
character’ with their personality traits (Fleeson & Wilt, 2010) and so 
it can be expected that they may also make judgments that are ‘out 
of character’ with their underlying traits. So, it is important that the 
relationship between trait and state emotions and their relationship 
to people’s judgments is examined more closely. As Rusting sensibly 
advocates, research including both states and traits will offer a more 
reliable picture of how emotions work to influence decisions 
(Rusting, 1999).
To date there is little research that has examined both trait and 
state empathy in legal judgments. One study showed how state 
empathy influenced judgments and that high - compared to low - 
trait empathizers attributed the crime to more situational causes and 
held the offender less responsible for the offense (Archer et al., 1979). 
However, as stated earlier, there are problems associated with 
attempts to assess trait empathy in potential jurors. Nonetheless 
many lawyers have recognised the potential value of trait empathy. 
As Archer et al. (1979) comment, one successful lawyer preferred 
emotionally-inclined jurors because this would help him to elicit 
empathy for his clients. More recently, researchers in the U.S.A. note 
that attorneys may employ the voir dire process to select jurors who 
empathize with their client since they are likely to make judgments 
in the client’s favour (Eagle, 2013). If such tactics are used in court by 
attorneys, it becomes even more imperative that researchers gain a 
clearer understanding of the individual and collective influence of 
trait and state empathy in judgments and how these two important 
influences on legal judgments work together.
The Current Study
This study used an individual mock juror paradigm. This was 
partly because it is not legal to interview actual jurors in the U.K. and 
partly because laboratory-based work enables the manipulation of 
variables whilst controlling for extraneous influences on judgments 
(Devine, 2012). The study aimed to assess: 1) the importance of 
empathy in judgments of a defendant; 2) whether trait or state 
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whether trait and state empathy work together or independently to 
influence judgments.
Mock juror research often focuses on very serious offenses such 
as homicide following sexual or domestic abuse (Plumm & Terrance, 
2009). However, such crimes are relatively rare and their content 
may elicit strong emotions in jurors. This study aimed to see if 
empathy can influence judgments in more commonplace, and less 
emotive crimes. If it does then it can be said, with a degree of 
certainty, that decision-makers’ empathy is potentially important to 
most court cases. For the purpose of this research a case involving 
physical assault was used to examine empathy’s relevance.
To understand more of the effects of empathy its influence was 
examined when the defendant shows no emotion. Previous work has 
relied on trials with emotional content to elicit empathic responses 
in mock jurors. However, research shows that when tasks are 
ambiguous, judgments are likely to become more trait congruent 
(Rusting, 1998). So, this study aimed to clarify this process by 
assessing if empathy inclines people to attribute emotions to an 
emotionally expressionless defendant.
For theoretical purposes this research also aimed to understand 
more of the relationship between trait and state empathy by 
examining if trait and state empathy interact act in accordance with 
one of Rusting’s (1998, 1999) three theoretical frameworks (see 
above) in a mock jury context.
Expectations were that: high levels of empathy (trait and/or state) 
would a) predict attributions of remorse to an emotionally 
expressionless defendant, and b) predict leniency in punishment, 
responsibility, future offending judgments and disagreement with a 
guilty verdict. No predictions were made regarding the relationship 
between trait and state empathy: this part of the study was purely 
exploratory.
Method
Participants
One hundred and fifty eight undergraduate students participated 
for course credit. Twenty-six were male and 132 were female. 
Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 59 years (M = 20.37, SD = 5.82). 
All were required to be native English speakers to guarantee 
comprehension of the colloquial English used by scenario characters.
Design
The study used an individual mock juror design, similar to that 
used by Haegerich and Bottoms (2000). Power analysis showed that 
a sample size of 68 was necessary to identify a medium effect and a 
sample of 485 for a small effect. Consequently, this study’s sample 
size of 158 was sufficient to identify a small to medium effect 
(Cohen’s f2 = .062).
Procedure
The study was advertised via a university research participation 
website which asked for native English speakers to volunteer to 
participate. Once participants had volunteered, data collection took 
place in a quiet laboratory in groups of 6. Participants were seated 
apart to prevent collaboration and the researcher stayed in the 
room throughout. Participants were provided with an information 
sheet which provided researchers’ details and an outline of the 
study’s aims. They were then given the chance to ask questions and, 
if happy to continue (none refused), they were informed of their 
rights to anonymity, confidentiality and to withdraw at any time 
without repercussions. They were then asked to sign a consent 
form. All participants were provided with a unique participation 
number, for potential identification purposes, on all their materials 
except the consent form which was kept separate from 
questionnaires. 
In the first part of data collection participants completed a 
questionnaire (IRI; Davis, 1983) to assess their trait empathy. 
Following this, they were randomly presented with one of two 
separate versions of the trial; one containing state empathy induction 
(experimental condition, n = 79), the other did not (controls, n = 79). 
State empathy was induced in the experimental condition by adding 
dialogue to the defense attorney’s opening and closing statements 
(see below). After reading the transcript, participants completed a 
questionnaire to assess their judgments of the case. Each data 
collection session lasted approximately 35 minutes. Following 
completion of the study participants received a verbal and written 
debrief and were able again to ask questions.
Materials and Measurements
The first questionnaire included a series of demographic 
questions that assessed each participant’s age (measured as actual 
age) their gender and whether they had ever been a victim of assault 
(measured as yes or no) since this may impact on their perception 
of the defendant. The second questionnaire was the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983) which comprises 28 items to 
assess trait empathy. Example questions include: “I believe that there 
are two sides to every question and try to look at them both”), and 
“When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I 
would feel if the events in the story were happening to me” and “I often 
have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.” Nine 
items were reverse-scored to prevent biased responding (e.g. “I 
sometimes find it difficult to see things from the ‘other guy’s’ point of 
view”, “Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great 
deal”). All items were measured using a five-point scale, ranging 
from one (Doesn’t describe me very well) to five (Describes me very 
well). Internal consistency for this scale was good (Cronbach’s α = .81). 
The trial scenario materials (DPP v Hopper & Lush, 2002) were 
presented in a 20-page booklet explaining how an offender had 
been charged with assaulting a colleague, causing a permanent and 
debilitating injury. After admitting hitting the victim during an 
argument over the offender’s girlfriend, the offender pleaded Not 
Guilty due to provocation. Participants read the defense and 
prosecution attorneys’ opening and closing statements and evidence 
from four witnesses: two defense (the offender and his girlfriend) 
and two prosecution (the investigating police officer and the victim). 
State empathy was induced in the experimental condition via the 
defense attorney’s opening and closing statements. The opening 
statement ended with:
“I ask you, please, members of the jury, that as you consider the 
evidence about to be presented, imagine how you would feel if 
you were in the defendant’s shoes. Here was a man whose good 
friend had betrayed his trust, and then attacked him. How would 
you have felt and reacted if you had been in his place?”
The closing statement ended with:
“I ask you, members of the jury, to consider how you would feel if 
you were to be told that a trusted friend had been making 
advances on your partner. I ask you to consider how you would 
feel if you needed to pick up a baseball bat in order to protect 
yourself and your partner. And I ask you to consider how you 
would feel if you were then the one to find yourself facing criminal 
prosecution.”
In the control condition, these statements were omitted. 
At the end of each transcript participants read that the offender 
had been found guilty by a majority verdict. More commonly, 
participants’ views on offender guilt are assessed using a continuous 
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(Mitchell, Haw, Pfeifer, & Meissner, 2005). Also, dichotomous verdict 
judgments provide only limited testable information. For example, 
those judging the offender to be Not Guilty have no need to provide 
punishment judgments since punishment does not follow acquittal. 
By providing the trial outcome it was possible to examine participants’ 
attitudes toward the verdict and their recommendation of 
punishment without losing any data. The description of the verdict 
being returned by a majority verdict aimed to emphasize to 
participants that at least some of the real jurors disagreed with the 
guilty verdict and thus discourage participant inclinations to socially 
conform to a unanimous verdict an effect demonstrated by 
Pennington & Hastie (1992). Providing participants with a verdict 
enabled them to see their own judgments in context of others’ whilst 
also assessing their punishment decisions without losing data.
In line with previous experimental work (Haegerich & Bottoms, 
2000), participants were asked to write a short paragraph after 
reading the trial transcript: experimental participants wrote a brief 
paragraph describing how they believed they would feel if they were 
in the offender’s position, whilst controls wrote about their general 
thoughts and feelings about the case. This served to reinforce the 
transcripts’ empathy inductions. All participants then completed an 
identical series of case-related items: 
1.    A state empathy scale (adapted from Haegerich & Bottoms, 
2000) assessed empathy with the offender. Internal consistency 
for this scale was excellent (Cronbach’s α = .87). This scale was 
also used to test empathy induction. The scale had seven items 
(e.g. I can really imagine what Pete, the offender, must have been 
feeling the night of the crime), and was scored using a seven-
point Likert scale ranging from one (Strongly disagree) to seven 
(Strongly agree). 
2.    Participants’ attributions of remorse to the offender were 
assessed using two items (e.g., How genuinely remorseful do 
you believe Pete, the offender, feels for committing the 
offence?), and was scored on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging 
from one (Not at all) to seven (Extremely). Internal consistency 
for these two items was excellent (Cronbach’s α = .85). The trial 
transcript contained no reference to any emotions expressed or 
felt by the offender, so any attributions of remorse originated 
solely from participants’ own interpretations of his behavior. 
3.    A responsibility scale (adapted from Haegerich & Bottoms, 
2000) assessed evaluations of the offender’s responsibility for 
the offense. The scale had three items (e.g. “Please rate the 
degree to which you believe Pete, the offender, is to blame for 
Chris’s injury”), and was scored on a seven-point Likert scale, 
ranging from one (Not at all) to seven (Completely). Internal 
consistency for this scale was also excellent (Cronbach’s α = 
.86).
4.   Finally, participants were asked to make three case judgments. 
The first asked if participants agreed with the guilty verdict (0 
= no, 1 = yes). The second asked for an appropriate offender 
punishment, with options ranging from zero (Community 
Punishment) to seven (11+ years in prison). The final item asked 
for participants’ beliefs as to whether the offender would 
commit a similar offence in the future, on a Likert scale ranging 
from one (Not at all likely) to seven (Extremely likely).
Results
Preliminary Analysis
Descriptive data for the variables of the study may be seen at Table 
1. A t test assuming unequal variances (Levene’s test of equal variances, 
F = 5.39, p < .05) showed that empathy induction was successful. 
Experimental participants, reported higher levels of state empathy 
with the defendant (M = 4.34, SD = 1.02) than did controls (M = 3.87, 
SD = 1.21), t(151.1) = -2.60, p < .01, d = 0.42, 95% CI [-5.73, -0.79].
Defendant Remorse and Responsibility
Trait and state empathy together with the demographic variables, 
age, gender (dummy coded as 0 & 1) and ever been a victim of assault 
(dummy coded as 0 & 1) were entered as independent variables (IVs) 
in a series of multiple regressions to examine their effects on 
judgments. This was necessary to identify if demographics had any 
effect on participants’ responses.
The first regression used attributions of defendant remorse as the 
dependant variable (DV). The model was significant, accounting for 
11% of the variance, power (1-β) = .88 (see Table 2). The significant 
predictors as shown by the regression analysis were age (older 
participants were more likely to attribute remorse to the defendant), 
and state and trait empathy (higher state and/or trait empathizers 
attributed more remorse to the defendant). 
The second regression used judgments of defendant responsibility 
for the offence. The model was significant, and accounted for 4.4% of 
the variance, power (1-β) = .90 (see Table 2). The regression analysis 
showed that state empathy was a significant predictor as shown by 
and showed that participants highest in state empathy judged the 
defendant to be less responsible for the offence.
Punishment, Future Offending and Verdict
Subsequent regression models predicting punishment decisions, 
F(5, 150) = 0.77, ns, power (1-β) = .30 and future offending beliefs, F(5, 
150) = 0.22, ns, power (1-β) = .30, were not significant. 
A logistic regression was used to see if participants agreed with 
the verdict. Trait and state empathy and demographic variables were 
entered as IVs and verdict agreement as the DV. Results (see Table 3) 
produced a reliable model, χ2(1) = 14.85, p < .001, accounting for 
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for all variables: Control and experimental groups
Variable Control Group Experimental Group
MS DMS D
Trait empathy (IRI total) 70.63 9.25 68.30 11.87
State empathy (empathy 
with defendant)
27.11 8.50 30.40 7.13
Perceived defendant 
remorse
8.70 3.07 9.35 2.84
Perceived defendant 
responsibility
16.80 3.40 15.91 3.30
Likelihood that defendant 
will commit similar offense 
in future
3.08 1.50 3.15 1.41
Table 2
Multiple regression analyses predicting attributions of remorse and responsibility
DV: Attributions of remorse DV: Attributions of 
responsibility
β tpβ tp
Trait empathy .18 2.09 .038 -.05 -0.57 .571
State empathy .26 3.25 .001 -.26 -3.15 .002
Age .20 2.59 .011 .03 0.40 .689
Gender .01 0.14 .887 -.05 -0.64 .527
Victim of assault .13 1.57 .118 .03 0.36 .721
Note. Remorse R2 = .110, F(5, 149) = 4.83, p < .001, N = 155. Responsibility R2 = .044, F(5, 
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between 9.1% and 13.5% of the variance, power (1-β) = .90 and 
classifying correctly, 73.7% of cases who disagreed with the jury’s 
verdict and 95.8% of cases who agreed with the jury’s verdict. Only 
state empathy was an important predictor and showed that each 
unit increase in state empathy was associated with a decrease in the 
odds of agreeing with the guilty verdict. Raw data showed that 82.3% 
of participants in the empathy not induced group (controls) agreed 
with the guilty verdict, whereas 69.2% of participants in the empathy 
induced group (experimental group) agreed with the guilty verdict. 
This suggests that participants higher in state empathy - regardless 
of whether they were in the control or experimental group - were 
less likely to agree with the guilty verdict.
Trait and State Empathy Relationship
Since defendant remorse was the only DV predicted by both trait 
and state empathy, it was sensible to use this to test for an interaction 
between trait and state empathy.
Trait Empathy as a Moderator of State Empathy
Trait and state empathy scores were centered (using X - M 
procedure) and an interaction term calculated from their product. 
The centered and interaction terms for trait and state empathy were 
entered into a regression to predict defendant remorse. Results 
showed a non-significant main effect of centered trait empathy (β = 
.085, p = .276), a significant main effect of centered state empathy (β 
= .263, p < .001) and a non-significant interaction term (β = .141, p = 
.07), accounting for 9.1% of the variance, F(3, 154) = 6.13, p < .001, 
power (1-β) = .87. This suggests that trait empathy does not moderate 
state empathy’s effects on remorse attributions.
State Empathy as a Mediator of Trait Empathy
To examine whether the relationship between trait empathy and 
defendant remorse was mediated by state empathy, it was first 
necessary to examine whether the hypothesised causal variable 
(trait empathy) was correlated with the hypothesised mediator 
(state empathy; Baron & Kenny, 1986). A regression analysis indicated 
that this first requirement was not satisfied (β = .116, p = .148). Thus, 
state empathy cannot act as a mediator for the effects of trait 
empathy.
To explore these findings further the role of gender in trait and 
state empathy was examined. Gender was not an important predictor 
in any of the regression analyses. This seemed odd since research 
supports that women have higher levels of empathy than do men 
(Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983). To examine this further an equal 
variance t test was performed (Levene’s tests for equality of variance 
were not significant for state empathy, p = .86, and for trait empathy, 
p = .35) to compare male and female trait and state empathy. Results 
showed that, similar to previous findings, women (M = 70.63, SD = 
10.06) compared to men (M = 63.62, SD = 11.83), did indeed have 
higher levels of trait empathy, t(154) = -3.15, p < .01, d = 0.51, 95% CI 
[-11.41, -2.62]. However, further analysis showed that men (M = 33.11, 
SD = 8.17) compared to women (M = 27.86, SD = 7.68) had higher 
levels of state empathy with the defendant, t(155), = 3.15, p < .01, d = 
0.51, 95% CI [1.95, 8.55].
Discussion
This study aimed to assess: 1) empathy’s importance in judgments 
of a defendant; 2) whether trait or state empathy exerts more 
influence in legal judgments; and 3) whether trait and state empathy 
work together or independently to influence judgments of a 
defendant.
The expectation that empathy would predict attributions of 
defendant remorse and responsibility was upheld. Participants with 
higher levels of trait and/or state empathy believed the defendant 
felt remorse even though he showed no emotion. Participants with 
higher state empathy also held the defendant less responsible for the 
offense. This finding is unique and important. It suggests that high 
empathizers may believe that a defendant is remorseful, even if she/he 
shows no emotion. They then use this assumption to attribute lower 
responsibility to the defendant for the offense. 
The expectation that empathy would lead to lenient punishment 
decisions and beliefs that the defendant would not offend again was 
not upheld. However, state, but not trait empathy, successfully 
predicted disagreement with the guilty verdict. Thus, the current 
findings suggest that even when participants knew that 10 out of 12 
other jurors found the defendant guilty, social conformity effects 
found in previous work (Pennington & Hastie, 1992), did not influence 
them to agree. Rather, it seems that their state empathy may have 
influenced their disagreement with the guilty verdict. This is 
important since it suggests that state empathy may act to reduce 
social conformity effects in legal judgments. 
These findings show that it is state and not trait empathy that has 
most relevance in legal judgments. It is not clear why trait empathy 
was important only in predicting defendant remorse. Perhaps high 
trait empathizers are predisposed to expect others to feel as they 
would in a similar situation and so they attribute emotions to others 
that they would expect to feel but this effect is not strong enough to 
influence other judgments too. This question cannot be answered 
from the current data, but future work could certainly test this effect.
For theoretical purposes the relationship between trait and state 
empathy was examined and no interaction was found. This finding 
may seem counterintuitive since trait and state emotions often 
interact (Rusting, 1999). The current findings also show that even 
though females had higher levels of trait empathy, males had the 
highest levels of state empathy with the defendant. This result 
contradicts previous findings that females are more inclined to 
empathize with others (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983) and so why males 
had higher levels of state empathy for the defendant is not clear. 
However, as noted already, people may behave in ways that are 
inconsistent with their underlying personality traits - and feel 
comfortable doing so (Fleeson & Wilt, 2010). It could be that in the 
current study males, but not females, perceived a similarity between 
the defendant and themselves and that this elicited their state 
empathy for the defendant. Although previous work (Haegerich & 
Bottoms, 2000) has shown that empathy works independently of 
feelings of similarity to the defendant it seems likely that males in 
this study related to, and thus empathized with, the situational 
factors of the case rather than seeing the defendant as a similar 
other. As Fleeson and Wilt (2010) explain, state-content significance 
means that some behaviors feel more authentic because of their 
content and consequences and this is regardless of the individual’s 
traits. The defendant was a male involved in a violent altercation 
with a former friend who had apparently made sexual advances to 
the defendant’s partner. It may be that this situation generated a 
Table 3
Logistic regression predicting mock juror’s agreement with trial verdict from trait 
and state empathy, age, gender and victim status
B Wald OR
Trait empathy -.009 .191  .991
State empathy     -.630*** 10.149  .532
Age .018 .176 1.018
Gender -.019 .001 1.019
Victim of Assault -.181 .073 1.199
Note. *** p < .001. Block c2(1) = 14.85, p < .01.42  J. L Wood et al. / The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context 6 (2014) 37-43
greater social understanding in male participants than it did in 
female participants and that this social understanding induced 
feelings of state empathy for the defendant in males (see also 
Terrance, Plumm & Kehn, 2013, for a discussion on social 
understanding and gender). And, as Pennington and Hastie (1993) 
note, when a story has relevance to the listener’s personal social 
understanding it has greater credibility with listeners.
This finding also contrasts with previous work suggesting that 
women make more lenient judgments than do men (Haegerich & 
Bottoms, 2000) since it was the state empathizers (i.e. predominantly 
men) who disagreed with the guilty verdict. However, as noted 
earlier, many mock juror studies focus on emotive crimes (Haegerich 
& Bottoms, 2000; Plumm & Terrance, 2009). Such crimes may well 
generate a greater social understanding and hence, state empathy, in 
women. Equally, female participants in the current study may also 
have been responding to the state-content significance of the 
information and so responded in a way that is inconsistent with their 
trait inclinations. The current data cannot attest to this so more 
research is needed to understand more about this idea.
It can be concluded from the current data that when judging a 
defendant, trait and state emotions act independently. This has 
theoretical significance since it provides empirical support for 
Rusting’s (1998; 1999) first theoretical framework that state and trait 
empathy have independent effects on judgments. However, this 
finding is not conclusive since the power attached to the current 
analyses was not ideal and only a larger sample size could attest to 
the strength of this finding. Nonetheless, the fact that females had 
higher levels of trait empathy and males had higher levels of state 
empathy suggests that an interaction between trait and state 
empathy, even with a larger sample size, is unlikely. Future work 
could definitely examine this possibility.
This study is vulnerable to the usual vagaries of mock jury 
research with student populations (i.e. a lack of ecological validity). 
Despite participants attending carefully to the trial scenario, this 
study could not replicate the reality of a courtroom. However, as 
noted above, laboratory studies allow researchers to manipulate 
variables whilst controlling for extraneous effects on judgments 
(Devine, 2012). Research also shows that although student 
populations are unique, this does not adversely affect the validity of 
research conducted with them (Wiecko, 2010). Another limitation is 
the induction of empathy solely for the defendant. In reality, both 
sides would compete for jurors’ empathy, and this prevents broader 
conclusions. Future work could induce empathy for both defendant 
and victim. Most importantly, empathy must be explored in a design 
that includes deliberation. The current data cannot speak to the 
endurance of empathy during deliberation processes. Finally, future 
work could examine if empathy can be induced by using attorneys’ 
statements alone and examine responses to these tactics by seeing if 
low empathizers are more skeptical or more immune to empathy 
induction attempts. However, the aim of this study was to improve 
understanding of empathy’s effects primarily for theoretical purposes 
and since the empathy-induction was successful it seems that 
participants genuinely engaged with the trial transcript and that 
their judgments were sincerely delivered.
Conclusion
The research emphasis has mostly been on state empathy and so 
the examination of both trait and state empathy in legal judgments 
is novel. This study’s findings provide important implications for 
theory and courtroom practices. By including state and trait empathy 
the findings from this study show that the research emphasis on 
state rather than trait empathy is valid. The finding that whilst 
females had higher levels of trait empathy, males had higher levels 
of state empathy, suggests that gender differences in empathy are 
inconsistent and that situational factors may elicit state empathy 
regardless of existing trait empathy levels. Findings also show that 
attorneys’ statements can generate state empathy which, in turn, 
leads to attributions of emotions to others even when none is shown, 
fewer attributions of defendant responsibility for the offense, and 
disagreement with guilty verdicts returned by others. Importantly, 
since most court cases are more run-of-the-mill than the emotive 
cases favored by previous work, the current findings show that 
empathy is influential in lower-level court cases. Finally, although 
data was collected in a snap-shot of time many legal judgments are 
made over short periods (e.g. parole boards, magistrates’ courts) and 
so the current findings may be especially relevant to these contexts. 
From the current findings, it can be concluded that it is possible to 
induce empathy via attorney tactics and that empathy influences 
legal decisions and causes people to infer others’ emotions. And, 
from the rationale expressed by the judge above, this may result in 
misconceptions and hence bias in the courtroom.
Conflict of interest
The authors of this article declare no conflict of interest.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research 
Council [grant number RES-000-22-2847].
References
Archer, R. L., Foushee, H. C., Davis, M. H., & Aderman, D. (1979). Emotional empathy in 
a courtroom simulation: A person-situation interaction. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 9, 275-291. Doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1979.tb02711.x
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in 
social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,  51, 1173-1182. Doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.51.6.1173
BBC News (2006, July 6). No jail term for weeping criminal. Retrieved from http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/manchester/5153600.stm
Brooks, J. H., & Reddon, J. R. (2003). The two dimensional nature of remorse: An em-
pirical inquiry into internal and external aspects. Journal of Offender Rehabilitation, 
38(2), 1-15. Doi: 10.1300/J076v38n02_01
Chin, D. (2012). Sentencing: A role for empathy. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
160, 1561-1584.
Colby, T. (2012). In defense of judicial empathy. Minnesota Law Review, 96, 1944.
Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a mul-
tidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 113-126. 
Doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.44.1.113
Devine, D. J. (2012). Jury decision making: The state of the science. New York, NY: New 
York University Press.
DPP v Hopper and Lush, (2002). The courts administration authority. Retrieved from 
http://www.courts.sa.gov.au/Community/ForSchools/Resources/Lists/Mock%20
Court%20MultiDocuments/Attachments/2/R%20v%20Hopper.pdf
Eagle, M. M. (2013). Assessment of juror reasoning for compensatory damage award alloca-
tion in sexual harassment cases (Master’s thesis). Retrieved from http://repositories.tdl.
org/uh-ir/bitstream/handle/10657/ETD-UH-2012-05-460/EAGLE-.pdf?sequence=2
Eisenberg, N., & Lennon, R. (1983). Sex differences in empathy and related capacities. 
Psychological Bulletin, 94, 100-131. Doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.94.1.100
Fleeson, W., & Wilt, J. (2010). The relevance of big five trait content in behavior to 
subjective authenticity: Do high levels of within-person behavioral variability un-
dermine or enable authenticity achievement? Journal of Personality, 78, 1353-1382. 
Doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.2010.00653.x
Haegerich, T. M., & Bottoms, B. L. (2000). Empathy and jurors’ decisions in patricide 
trials involving child sexual assault allegations. Law and Human Behavior, 24, 421-
448. Doi: 10.1023/A:1005592213294
Heise, D. R. (1979). Understanding events: Affect and the construction of social action. 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
MacLin, M. K., Downs, C., MacLin, O. H., & Caspers, H. M. (2009). The effect of defen-
dant facial expression on mock juror decision-making: The power of remorse. Nor-
th American Journal of Psychology, 11, 323-332.
Mitchell, T. L., Haw, R. M., Pfeifer, J. E., & Meissner, C. A. (2005). Racial bias in mock 
juror decision-making: A meta-analytic review of defendant treatment. Law and 
Human Behavior, 29, 621-637. Doi: 10.1007/s10979-005-8122-9
Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1992). Explaining the evidence: Tests of the story model 
for juror decision-making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 189-206. 
Doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.62.2.189
Plumm, K. M., & Terrance, C. A. (2009). Battered women who kill: The impact of expert 
testimony and empathy induction in the courtroom. Violence against Women, 15, 
186-205. Doi: 10.1177/1077801208329145
Pyszczynski, T. A., & Wrightsman, L. S. (1981). The effects of opening statements on   J. L Wood et al. / The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context 6 (2014) 37-43  43
mock jurors’ verdicts in a simulated criminal trial. Journal of Applied Social Psycho-
logy, 11, 301-313. Doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1981.tb00826.x
Rusting, C. L. (1998). Personality, mood, and cognitive processing of emotional infor-
mation: Three conceptual frameworks. Psychological Bulletin, 124, 165-196. Doi: 
10.1037/0033-2909.124.2.165
Rusting, C. L. (1999). Interactive effects of personality and mood on emotion-con-
gruent memory and judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 1073-
1086. Doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.77.5.1073
Stevenson, M. C., Najdowski, C. J., Bottoms, B. L., & Haegerich, T. M. (2009). Understan-
ding adults’ perceptions of juvenile offenders. In B. L. Bottoms, G. S. Goodman, & C. 
J. Najdowski (Eds.), Child victims, child offenders: Psychology and law (pp. 349-368). 
New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Terrance, C. A., Plumm, K. M., & Kehn, A. (2013). Battered women who kill: Impact of 
expert testimony type and timing. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law. Advance online 
publication. Doi: 10.1080/13218719.2013.773846
Wiecko, F. M. (2010). Research note: Assessing the validity of college samples: Are 
students really that different? Journal of Criminal Justice, 38, 1186-1190.